Friday, August 30, 2013

Bir el Hafey, Tunisa, Feb 14 1943

Official Report of Squad Action at Bir Al Halfa, on 14 February 1943

Our squad, consisting of myself (SGT Lewis), CPL Meister, and PVTs Greeley, Dubois, Karas, Mckee, Despaux, and Crowenshield arrived at Bir Al Halfa at about 0800 hrs. We had all our assigned equipment, plus whatever we could scrounge prior to departing from the Battalion area. It turned out to be very fortunate for us that we did so, as it came in very handy in the subsequent action.

Crowenshield and I set up an observation point with the AC 556 radio and OE 292 antennae on a high hill about a mile southeast of the town while CPL Meister took the rest of the squad and the vehicles into the town to set-up defensive positions and secure it according to our mission instructions.

It was about 9:30 AM when the German attack came from the South and East. Armored and support vehicles in more than Battalion strength. We counted more than 40 armored vehicles by noontime (see appendix A of this report for number and types). Crowenshield did his best to get a signal out to headquarters as to what we were seeing, but the radio was so jammed with chatter, he doubted anybody could have distinguished his signal.

Eventually, we needed to take down our OE-292 antennae, so as not to risk divulging our position. Crowenshield and I kept low and continued to observe German troop movements through Bir Al Halfa with our binoculars, counting vehicles as they entered and subsequently left the town. The rest of the squad, led by CPL Meister hid in the town itself, about a mile from our position. Meister had the two hand-held radios. He and I had agreed that we turn them on only on each half-hour and check in with each other. This squad SOP served both to insure we would maintain contact at regular intervals, and also save on batteries we could not replace. When it was not on the half-hour mark, Crowenshield changed the crystals in the AC 556 radio to some others that he got from somewhere, and listened for German radio traffic. Sometimes, when he was able to tune in on something clear enough, I listened and tried to discern what the enemy was saying.

The German forces were extremely well-equipped, their advance was professional, and by about noon their front line forces and secondary support elements had pretty much passed by. Traffic had dwindled down to small groups of three to four light support vehicles at intervals of about 5 to 10 minutes between groups.

The balance of this report is a compilation of written reports and verbal statements from squad members who took part in the ensuing action, together with my own observations.

I transmitted in a short signal to CPL Meister when I estimated the lead German elements were about 10 minutes from the town. CPL Meister took the squad and vehicles and hid in a citrus fruit warehouse building near the center of town. There had been enough time for him to split the six squad members he had into two groups and reconnoiter enough of the town to choose this hiding place and back the vehicles in.

(Note the following paragraph in this “official” report covers the fact that we “kept” the Kublewagen we captured at the airfield for our own use without official approval.)
Through some strange and inexplicable quirk of fate, Meister found an intact and fully functional German Kublewagen, complete with a belt fed machine gun parked in the warehouse. There were no locals inhabitants, or Germans anywhere around to be found. All we could figure was that the car had been concealed there and left by some advance German scout element which must have taken cover elsewhere upon our arrival in Bir Al Halfa.

The warehouse building was rather large and had several sets of swing out double doors facing the center square of the town. Meister staged each of the now three vehicles with a machine gun in each facing nose out towards the square, and spread our equipment throughout the three vehicles equally. PVT Karas took the opportunity to load a couple of crates of the citrus fruits which were in the warehouse into one of the vehicles. This was commendable thinking on his part, because we were obviously not going to be getting any chow from our headquarters anytime soon.

Meister took one of the two hand-held radios the squad had and went up on the roof of the building to establish radio contact with Crowenshield and I. He also established an observation team on the roof with a tug-line running from the roof to the bays where the vehicles were. This is where the rest of the squad was hiding when the Germans arrived.

Meister did not have any luck contacting myself or Crowenshield by radio so he handed it off to PVT Karas, who kept trying until he got through. Meister relayed through Karas to Crowenshield and I on the hill that he would wait until the traffic of the Germans forces passing through the town dwindled to the point where he though it would be possible to escape using the vehicles. He planned on using our explosives as part of a diversion to catch the enemy off balance.

Once Crowenshield and I had established radio contact with the rest of the squad, we were able to communicate pretty consistently every half hour, using brief signals to keep each other informed of what we were seeing of the German forces.

Karas was part of the in-town observation team on the roof of the warehouse building, yet concealed on the backside of the roof ridge, while the rest of the squad took refuge with the vehicles. Meister kept one handheld radio and Karas had the other handheld on the roof. The observation team on the roof swapped out with squad members in the bays at intervals to insure the observers were fresh. Crowenshield and I were on the hill a mile outside of town with the AC 556 radio. For awhile we had the OE- 292 antennae up which helped our reception and transmission, but we eventually had to take it down.

We were able to pick up and translate one German radio signal from our position on the hill. It was, “Kampfgroup Heintzman – continue attack North to Sidi Bou Zid, secure communication and line of sight. 590th (garbled) moving west to the (garbled) to take airfield.” Without our 292 antennae in place it was useless trying to raise Battalion, and we did not desire to divulge our position to any German radio detection in any case.

There was one bit of useful information we observed from the hill and were able to relay to the rest of our squad in town. We counted vehicles entering the town on the road from the South, and then departing from the town on the road en-route North. At about 1400, we saw a German artillery unit pull into town, four vehicles towing guns entered, and only three went out North.

Meister reported that what his team first heard and then saw, was a heavy halftrack carrying eight Soldiers and towing an 88mm anti-aircraft gun. It stopped right in front of his part of the squad was in.

Two of the Soldiers dismounted and took up security over-watch positions with their rifles, while four others broke out their mess tins and started eating while still in the halftrack. The other two Soldiers from the halftrack dismounted and moved to the 88mm gun which was in tow and appeared to start some kind of maintenance operation on it.

Additionally, Meister’s observation team saw another group of four Germans wearing the breastplates of the Feldgendarmerie (military police), enter the square, moving from building to building. There were obviously clearing the town, checking each building.

Meister knew that it would only be a matter of time before the Germans clearing the buildings would get to the one where his squad and the vehicles were hidden. He devised a plan, informed his men, and executed it.

He assigned two Soldiers to each vehicle. The plan was to have one Soldier at the ready on the pintle mounted machine gun in each vehicle. The driver of each vehicle was to swing open the bay doors in front of it, then jump into the vehicle, start it, and take off. By immediately turning right down a secondary street this would avoid the main road through the town, and hopefully any additional Germans to deal with.

The desire was to take the Germans by surprise, with the machine guns opening up on the sector of Germans in front of each bay as soon as the doors were open. The fire would kill, or otherwise suppress the Germans, and give the drivers time to get in the vehicles, start them, and depart, turning right (South), down a side street, out past a citrus tree grove, then turn left (Southeast), skirt the edge of the grove, and arrive at a rendezvous point Meister and I had agreed upon, at the corner of another citrus tree grove on the Eastern side of the road entering the town from the South.

I had direct observation of the rendezvous point through my binoculars from my vantage point on the hilltop. It was a mile from our position, but figured we could get there on foot, and with a little luck, without being seen by the sporadic German convoys coming down the road. Particularly since we could choose the time we departed our position on the hill when no German vehicles were in sight, and radio this fact to Meister’s group.

The lead vehicle would be jeep #1 (in the bay furthest South in the building), with Greeley opening the bay doors, and driving, and Meister manning the .50 Cal Browning.

The second vehicle would be the Kublewagen, with Dubois driving, and Karas manning the machine gun. Dubois had an additional task after opening the doors of taking a shot with the squad bazooka at the halftrack before getting into the Kublewagen and driving it out. Dubois is the squads most experienced driver, as well as being our rifle grenadier.

The third vehicle coming out of the bay furthest North was jeep #2, driven by PVT McKee, with Despaux manning the .30 Cal Browning. McKee, our demolitions man, had prepared several hand grenades with a ¼ stick of TNT wired onto the body of the grenade with trip wire we had brought with us. He figured, (rightly so, as we found out) that it would enhance and enlarge the explosion of the grenades. What he didn’t realize until later is that it also made the grenades more awkward to handle.

When the time came when there were no German convoys on the road coming in, we radioed this fact to Meister’s group from our position on the hill, and Crowenshield and I started moving towards the rendezvous point. It was about two and half hours before dark. Crowenshield was packing the AC556 radio, but we left the 292 antennae, packed in its bag, buried and concealed on the hilltop. We were about halfway to the rendezvous point when we heard an explosion in town square. The rest of the squad provided the following account of events which I provide here for the record.

Dubois had opening his bay doors first, just enough so he had a clear shot at very short range with the bazooka at the halftrack. He put the rocket right into the grille, and the nose of the vehicle erupted into flames and smoke with a loud explosion.

The four Germans who had been in the halftrack, eating, leapt out two to either side, confused and taken by surprise. The two “guards on over-watch about 20 yards away from the nose of the halftrack at the ten’o’clock and two’o’clock, positions turned around in surprise and stared for a moment at the flames and smoke. They apparently had not discerned what cause the explosion, nor the where the rocket came from.

The four German MPs had been talking to a local inhabitant in front of a building about 75 feet in front of the warehouse. At the sound of the explosion, the local just seemed to instantly disappear. The German MPs were somewhat slower to react.

PVT Mckee had swung the doors in front of jeep #2 wide open first. PVT Despaux was the first to open fire with his .30 cal machine gun. He hit one of the Germans that had dismounted to the right of the halftrack (more or less in front of jeep #2), 50 yards away.

PVT Greeley got the doors in front of jeep #1 open next, and CPL Meister opened fire with .50 cal Browning, yelling and screaming as he did so. Greeley said, as he moved towards the drivers seat of the jeep after he opened the doors, that he could see Gus grinning ear to ear and laughing as he poured the .50 cal fire into the knot of four German MPs about 75 feet in front of the bay doors. Meister hit one of the MPs with the Browning causing him to somersaulted backward right to onto the ground, never to rise again. He reports the same burst grazed one of the others, but that MP didn’t go down.

PVT McKee’s jeep, although it was supposed to be last in line, emerged from it’s bay first. McKee turned it to the right, crossing in front of the flaming halftrack, and started to bear down on the German on that side which had been pulling security. The other German who had been pulling security on the North side of the halftrack, raised his rifle, and took a telling shot at McKee, hitting him in his left side. McKee was in the midst of trying to gently toss one of his “TNT enhanced grenades” out the drivers side at the feet of the other German security guy to the South of the burning halftrack. The grenade slipped from McKee’s grasp in mid-toss, bounced off the steering wheel, and then off the edge of the passenger side door opening, and… OUT of the jeep into the courtyard. I can only imagine how Despaux must have felt as that live, hissing, TNT enhanced grenade narrowly missed dropping into the passenger front floorboard of the moving jeep. As it was, the nearby explosion seconds later deafened PVT Despaux, and likewise stunned and knocked over the North side security German, who dropped his rifle as a result. PVT McKee was considerably shaken by the rifle hit, but was still able to drive the jeep.

Despite the explosion, Despaux was able to react, and fire a .30 cal burst into the German that had shot McKee, killing him before he could fire his rifle a second time.

PVT Karas, in the Kublewagen, was able to fire a burst at one of the Germans that had dismounted from the halftrack, dropping him. Dubois, driving the Kublewagen said he saw one German look at the Kublewagen, make an expression of recognition, and then lower his weapon. Dubois reports the German looked confused and bewildered as the Kublewagen veered to the right, falling in behind jeep #1 driven by Greeley.

Meister continued to pour bullets from the .50 Browning into the group of MPs, striking the one furthest away (although the moving jeep had brought Meister considerable closer). The shots reportedly cut the German in half, separating his torso from his legs. The same burst hit the last MP standing and took him down as well. Meister was alternately cackling with laughter, and yelling as he mowed down the enemy.

PVT Despaux kept up his fire with his .30 Cal Browning in the other jeep, and hit, and killed another of the dismounted Germans by the halftrack.

Karas concentrated on keeping the other Germans around the halftrack suppressed with his machine gun fire.

In the area of the square where this action took place, our six squad members led by Meister report seven of the 12 German there either killed or grievously wounded into unconsciousness, with the halftrack destroyed by the bazooka. PVT Mckee was the only one of ours Soldiers hit.

Our three vehicles successfully negotiated their way out of the square, through the grove, past a barn, and turned left (Southeast) towards the rendezvous point.

Crowenshield and I heard all the gunfire and explosions while we were en-route to the rendezvous point, but as we got closer, Crowenshield spotted two German motorcycles with sidecar mounted belt- fed machine guns. These two motorcycles, and the four Germans manning them had established a roadblock position right near our rendezvous point. Fortunately for us, and the rest of the squad, we saw them before they saw us.

Crowenshield and I (SGT Lewis) dropped prone. I instructed him that we would crawl up to within 75 yards, and open fire on them with our M1 rifles. I told him that he should take the Germans manning the motorcycle closest to us, while I took those a little further away. I also advised him to shoot the German manning the MG-34 on the sidecar first, and then the other second. I followed the same priority shooting at my targets. I could still feel the pain from my recent wound from getting hit at the airstrip just a day ago.

Crowenshield and I fired together, and effectively. Our first shots hit our targets, but did not kill them at once. The Germans returned fire with one burst from one MG-34, and another burst from an MP-40. Our second and third volleys succeeded in killing or wounding into unconsciousness all four. My final volley peppered the sidecar of my target pretty well.

Once the Germans were down, Crowenshield was up and running for their position, even as Meister and the rest of the squad approached with their three vehicles. I was sure glad to see them, and to see all the rest of the squad accounted for. My joy was short lived, because when I got a close look at Mckee, I saw he had been hit pretty badly.

As our three vehicles pulled up, I knew the Germans left in the town would need a few minutes to get organized and gather courage before they would be coming after us. I had Meister, Karas, and Despaux manning the three machine guns. Gus (manning the .50) and Despaux covered the approach from the town, and Karas down the road to the South, where the German convoys were coming from.

Crowenshield and Dubois, together with Greeley were doing something with the German motorcycles. Crowenshield managed to start the one that I had not been shooting at, while Greeley and Dubois were using tripwire, twine, and lengths of rope we had with us to rig the other cycle behind one of vehicle so we could tow it along. Dubois seemed excited with the idea of tinkering with the motorcycles, and I realized that Crowenshield knew how to operate one.

I applied first aid to McKee’s wounds using the Squads aid bag that McKee had in the vehicle with him. I didn’t want to stick around too long. We were too exposed. We had just about got the motorcycle rigged to tow when there was a noise from the town and I could see another German sidecar mounted motorcycle headed our way. Meister and Despaux each fired a burst with their machine guns at it, and it came no closer.


We got out of there, heading South down the road, stopping just long enough to retrieve the OE-292 antennae from its hiding place on the hill. - It would be dark in about two hours, and we needed to find a relatively safe place for the night.

1 comment:

  1. The post above was written by the Squad Leader, Sgt. Lee Lewis. The historical background here is of course the beginning of the German Operation FRüHLINGSWIND (Spring Breeze) - the northern pincer of what the history books will call the Kasserine Pass battles.
    There is not one battle, but in fact four distinct actions over several days from Feb 14th 1943 to Feb 21st 1943 that the squad is now embroiled in. Frühlungswind was commanded by Col.Gen. Hans-Jürgen von Arnim, and was primarily German units rushed to Tunisia to confront the allied forces that landed in Algeria months before. The southern pincer, MORGENLUFT (Morning Air) was commanded by Rommel himself though the Americans thought he was everywhere.

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