Memorandum for Record
RE: After Action Review (AAR) for Combat Patrol
Per Company SOP, this memorandum documents the AAR's key findings and summary critique of the events of DATE CENSORED.
Mission: on DATE CENSORED, 1st Squad of UNIT CENSORED executed a combat patrol in the vicinity Objective FULTON to locate and destroy direct-fire weapons responsible for the destruction of scout elements deployed in sector within the last 24 hours.
Outcome: The mission was an overall success. The squad successfully destroyed an 88mm towed gun, a 20mm Flakpanzer mounted on a wheeled chassis, and an MG34 machine-gun nest, all without taking casualties. The enemy suffered at least 6 dead and approximately 10 wounded and further withdrew in disorder. An additional 20mm Flakpanzer survived the battle but retreated West as the fight progressed. Local gains were not exploited due to the small size of the attacking squad.
Highlights:
- The plan was discussed openly among the squad - everyone knew the mission, the goals, and the concept of the operation. All squad members gave input to varying degrees. Terrain was simulated on a sand table. METT-T was used to round out the specifics of the mission. Ocoka was used to analyze the sand table diagram.
- The plan provided for flexibility as the squad probed the enemy defenses. There was a good deal of flexibility to modify the route and interim objectives mid-stream. Key to this capability was the fact that the squad moved in bounds, but largely stayed together as a unit until dispersing on the objective to destroy individual objectives. Staying together kept command and control issues to a minimum and allowed for leaders to confer on plans as they changed.
- Key tasks were portioned out based upon individual strengths. The notable contributions of the Scout section, the MG team, and the Bazooka team during the patrol all played to their strengths. In retrospect, it is clear the squad worked as a team and acted as a team.
- The squad executed the combat patrol at night, with the goal of locating and then surprising the enemy. The patrol leader decided to conduct operations at night due to the obvious overwhelming fire superiority of the defending force. It was critical to avoid a toe-to-toe shootout with the enemy.
- Conducting the operation at night robbed the enemy of key capabilities:
1. The enemy could not bring effective indirect-fire weapons into play, given the low visibility and poor moonlight.
2. The enemy could not bring direct-fire weapons into play with any effect; they were essentially firing blind off range cards.
3. The enemy was forced to fight local firefights in which the attacking squad had chosen the terms of the engagement.
- Individual courage and initiative were outstanding:
1. The scouts quite notably silently killed 4 Germans manning or relieving the Observation Post, preserving the stealthy approach of the team.
2. The bazooka team took the initiative to maneuver into a firing position that gave them open fields of fire across the German position. This allowed the bazooka to provide direct fire at a critical moment in the battle, destroying one flakpanzer (20mm) and forcing the second to withdraw.
3. The Platoon Sergeant led the charge on the 88mm emplaced gun, personally starting a firefight that forced the enemy to abandon the gun, which he subsequently destroyed via thermite grenade. Because of the Platoon Sergeant's actions, the 88 did not fire during the battle.
4. The machine-gun team staked out and then destroyed a machine-gun nest emplaced at the end of a trench line, successfully taking out a key weapon that could easily displace to cover our line of withdrawal. In concert with illumination rounds, this weapon could have had devastating results if our MG team had not killed the crew.
Lowlights:
- The indirect-fire weapons (large-tube mortars) providing illumination rounds were not located prior to the firefight. Mortars are always pre-sighted for final protective fires effectively on top of the enemy's positions -- thus the squad could have been taken out with one well-placed fire mission. Had the firefight taken more than a few minutes, this would have been a key concern. As it was, the firefight was so fast that the enemy did not have time to fire indirect rounds in the defense.
- Even though indirect fire support was not offered by Battalion, an indirect fire plan should have been developed anyway, with map pre-plots communicated to Company and Battalion. Indirect fire can always be made available under the right conditions. For example, if the squad had stumbled into an advancing Panzer Division, Division or Corps artillery might have been allocated on the fly. More importantly, if the unit had been ambushed, there was no contingent fire support plan to aid in withdrawal. In such an emergency, indirect fires will often be made available.
- Signal was not used as effectively as it could have been. Red lenses on flashlights could have cut down on runner movement between sections (e.g., one flash to the rear for hold position, two for move to me). Star clusters were available but not used. Whistles were available but not used; at night, we should consider using these to signal for medic or evacuation routes. Most importantly, radios were used up to the OP then switched off. Company headquarters was in the dark as to progress until the fight was over. A contact report should have been sent at the start of the battle, even if only to say that the fight was going well.
- There was no plan for diversion of fire should the stealthy approach fail. If resources had been available, a .50 caliber machine gun positioned along the line of departure should have been made available with a minimal crew to lay down an emergency base of fire to cover the withdrawal and to draw enemy fire. A couple of cooks with a .50 caliber on a truck could have accomplished this basic task. Indirect assets could also have been provided to cover withdrawal or to further exploit the enemy's withdrawal, but there was no plan for this.
- Combined arms procedures of putting 3 different killing systems on a given target could not be achieved. However, the dispersal of the enemy and the demands placed on the small squad to engage multiple targets at once forced the decision. The squad was able to simultaneously engage multiple pockets of resistance with devastating results, regardless.
Summary:
The results speak for themselves -- the right mass and weight of force was in the right place to engage and overwhelm the defenders throughout the engagement. The patrol leader will be submitting individual citation awards for the scouts, bazooka, machine-gun team, and Platoon Sergeant for their acts of initiative and bravery.
1LT Levy, Platoon Leader
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